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LEGAL KILLING: THE IMMINENT
LEGALIZATION OF A PHYSICIAN'S
AFFIRMATIVE AID-IN-DYING
I. INTRODUCTION
I will follow that method of treatment which, according to
my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and
mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if
asked, nor suggest such counsel; furthermore, I will not
give to a woman an instrument to produce abortion.1
The Hippocratic Oath expressly provides that a physi-
cian should serve solely as healer-not killer.2 If a physician
is provided with the simple solution of killing his or her sick
patients, he or she may have less incentive to perform the
more arduous, time-consuming, and possibly fruitless task of
curing. Judeo-Christian thought corroborates the oath:
"Thou shalt not kill."3
Although some physicians have almost certainly covertly
ignored the oath's mandate for centuries, only recently has
support for the oath's rejection become overt. Proposals la-
beled "Death with Dignity,"4 "Aid-In-Dying,"5 "Physician-As-
sisted Death,"6 or "Physician-Assisted Suicide" 7 seek to legal-
1. The Oath of Hippocrates (460-359 B.C.), reprinted in MILTON D.
HEIFETZ, M.D. & CHARLES MANGEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 179-80 (1975).
2. See Richard G. Benton, Death and Dying 42-43 (1978); see also In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977). The In re
Quinlan court explained that "the moral matrix of medicine [is] 'to heal'...."
Id. at 667.
3. Deuteronomy 5:17.
4. See CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HuMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT (1992). Submitted to the general voting populace as Proposi-
tion 161, the initiative failed by a margin of 54% to 46%. Key Proposition Re-
sults by County, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1992, at 17EL.
5. See Sheldon F. Kurtz and Michael J. Saks, Model Aid-In-Dying Act, 75
IOWA L. REV. 125 (1989).
6. Dr. Ronald B. Miller, Lecture at Hoag Memorial Hospital (Oct. 23,1992)
(audio cassette available in the library of Hoag Memorial Hospital, Newport
Beach, CA).
7. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at 34
(1992) (rebuttal to argument in favor of Proposition 161).
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ize a physician's assistance in dying. Whatever the language,
no modern jurisdiction has yet declared the process legal.8
The physician-assisted death topic is fascinating because
it involves important legal, social, moral, and religious issues.
The range of views is as diverse as it is broad. There are
those who believe in a right of self-determination where au-
tonomy and choice give one complete control over one's body.9
On the other hand, society has traditionally discouraged non-
natural death.' ° Whatever the opinion, the possibility that
the physician could, without legal recourse, affirmatively act
to terminate the life of his or her patient with a needle, gas
mask, or some other instrument is unprecedented. Legaliz-
ing such an act conflicts with the historical discouragement of
suicide and suicide assistance, thus moving into previously
uncharted territory. It is certainly advisable to stop and ex-
plore such a revolutionary idea before it is legalized.
This comment focuses on the legal issues arising from a
statutory proposal to legalize physician-assisted death.
While the courts have had ample chance to review a patient's
8. The Netherlands has not officially declared the process legal, but its
courts will not prosecute when certain rules are followed. See, e.g., M.A.M de
Wachter, Ph.D., Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316, 3318-
19 (Dec. 15, 1989); cf G. Van Der Wal, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. I.
How Often is it Practised by Family Doctors in the Netherlands? 9 FAM. PRAc.
130 (1992); G. Van Der Wal, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. II. Do Dutch
Family Doctors Act Prudently? 9 FAm. PRAc. 135 (1992). The Netherlands'
lower house of parliament recently promised immunity to physicians who follow
certain euthanasia guidelines, "[b]ut physicians who fail to satisfy the guide-
lines could still face criminal charges and.., up to 12 years in prison." Tamara
Jones, Netherlands Law Sets Guidelines for Euthanasia, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1993, at Al, A8. The action of the lower house is subject to two governmental
formalities (approval by the upper house of parliament and receipt of the crown
seal) before it becomes law in early 1994. Dutch Lawmakers Approve Rules for
Doctor-Assisted Mercy Killings, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 10, 1993, at A14.
The Dutch law will require a voluntary, well informed, and enduring request by
the patient. Jones, supra, at A8. It also will require that a second physician be
consulted, and that each doctor submit a fully documented report on each case
to the district coroner. Id. The coroner will then submit a report to the local
prosecutor, who will summarily close the case upon a finding that all the re-
quirements were satisfied. Id.
9. HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE SUS-
TAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 19 (1987).
10. See Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 52, (Mar.-Apr. 1992). Callahan notes the "long-standing effort to
limit the circumstances under which one person can take the life of another,
from efforts to control the free flow of guns and arms, to abolish capital punish-
ment and to more tightly control warfare." Id.
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choice to withdraw medical treatment,1 it is rare for the
courts to rule on a patient's choice to have his or her doctor
affirmatively put him or her to death.12 The difference be-
tween passive euthanasia and active euthanasia'3 is largely
uncharted; this comment explores the potential for the legali-
zation of physician-assisted death, one form of active eutha-
nasia, and the resulting ramifications.
First, the background section of this comment examines
the reasons compelling the legalization of physician-assisted
death.14 The court cases that have acknowledged or assumed
one's right to die are then presented. 15 While these cases in-
volve only the withdrawal of treatment, the background sec-
tion proffers the next step beyond withdrawal of treat-
ment-legalized active euthanasia. 1 6  In particular,
California's failed Proposition 161, the Death with Dignity
Act, would have legalized physician-assisted death. 17  The
analysis section examines this proposition, its language and
legal requirements,' 8 the reasons why the voters rejected it,
and possible modifications.' 9 The comment proposes alterna-
11. See, e.g, Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977); Bouvia v.
Superior Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Ct., 209
Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
12. The Michigan case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian and his suicide machines has
gained much media attention. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, Mercy's Friend or Foe?,
TIME, Dec. 28, 1992, at 36. Dr. Kevorkian's case is inapposite to the matter at
hand. This comment explores the legalization of physician-assisted death
through statutory means. Dr. Kevorkian acted on the cusp of statutory law,
and the Michigan legislature altered its law in order to prohibit him from as-
sisting patients in suicide. Id. at 37.
13. Euthanasia is "[tihe act or practice of painlessly putting to death per-
sons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy."
BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 554 (6th ed. 1990). Passive euthanasia normally en-
tails the omission of treatment. For example, passive euthanasia includes "the
disconnection of life-support equipment without which one cannot live." DEREK
HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT, THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED
SUICIDE FOR THE DYING 3 (1992). Active euthanasia involves affirmative steps
directed towards ending life. Id. This comment focuses on physician-assisted
dying, a form of active euthanasia.
14. See discussion infra part II.A-C.
15. See discussion infra part II.D.
16. See discussion infra part II.E.
17. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT (1992). See also discussion infra part II.E.1.
18. See discussion infra part III.A.
19. See discussion infra part III.A., IV.
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tives necessary to make the Proposition socially palatable 20
and summarizes these proposals in a checklist.21
In short, this comment explores the safeguards that may
be necessary to impel a majority to vote for physician-assisted
death. After reviewing the safeguards, the analysis turns to
the court's role in reviewing such a statute. This comment
ultimately concludes that the authors should draft such pro-
posals carefully so as to minimize coercive forces and insulate
a patient's choice. Providing alternatives such as hospices
and local advisory boards will help to minimize coercion and
to increase respect for all groups subject to physician-assisted
death.
II. BACKGROUND
Three phenomena account for the recent movement to le-
galize physician-assisted death. First, modern medical ad-
vancements have resulted in longer, but often painful, costly,
and undesirable lives; many patients would rather not en-
dure such an artificially prolonged death, but instead prefer
an immediate end.22 Second, there is greater acceptance of
suicide, at least in part because of the specter of artificially
prolonged lives. Third, modern emphasis on patient auton-
omy, coupled with greater acceptance of a patient's right to
choose suicide, has compelled a broader population to ques-
tion the Hippocratic Oath's absolute prohibition of physician-
assisted death.23
20. See discussion infra part IV.
21. See discussion infra part V.
22. This concept is often referred to as a dignified death, or "death with
dignity." See discussion infra part V (proposed factors to consider when legaliz-
ing physician-assisted death). See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing "Nancy Cruzan is
entitled to choose to die with dignity.").
23. In a field poll taken two months prior to the vote on the California prop-
osition, voters who were read a summary of the measure favored it by a margin
of 68% to 24%. Robert Reinhold, California to Decide if Doctors Can Aid in
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at Al, A10. Although it was ultimately dis-
carded, the California proposition garnered the support of 46% of the electorate.
Key Proposition Results by County, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1992, at
17EL.
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A. Modern Technology and the Prolonged Death
In many circumstances, death is now viewed as a techni-
cal phenomenon rather than a natural process.24 Since
World War II, respiratory ventilators, dialysis machines,
heart and kidney transplantation, artificial hearts, artificial
blood, and artificial skin have greatly improved the ability to
sustain life despite the failure of bodily functions.25 Whereas
the majority of deaths previously resulted from communica-
ble diseases such as influenza, pneumonia, and tuberculosis,
modern deaths are more likely to result from degenerative
diseases: "Modern medicine has gotten the population past
life threatening diseases and to the point at which death
more commonly comes from gradual bodily failure than from
sudden infection. Its success has, in turn, increased life ex-
pectancy thereby increasing the elderly, more frail popula-
tion."26 The transformation from a vibrant human into a frail
object can be humiliating and undignified. The frail patient
is more likely to find an offer of death with dignity attractive.
Modern technology's prolongation of death has not only
increased the population of frail patients but has also in-
creased medical costs. Health care has grown fifty percent
faster than the rest of the economy, 27 and at about $800 bil-
lion in expenditures, it may be America's largest industry.28
Medical care has nearly tripled from 5.3% of gross national
product in 196029 to a full 13% in 1992.30
In particular, terminally ill patients account for a dispro-
portionately high percentage of these medical costs: "[T]he
United States spends two percent of its gross domestic prod-
24. See HUMPHRY, supra note 13, at 3. Humphry explains that at least one-
half of all deaths occur after the decedent has spent time connected to a
machine. Id.
25. George J. Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 67, 68
(1988).
26. Id. at 69.
27. See Caspar W. Weinberger, A New Book for AU Seasons, FORBES, Jan. 4,
1993, at 33.
28. See James Flanigan, Hard Choices, Opportunities Lie Ahead for Nation,
State. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at D1, D4.
29. See Alexander, supra note 25, at 71.
30. Marc Fisher, Germany's Health System: Model for America or Plan in
Crisis?, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al, A18. By comparison, Germany
spends eight percent of its gross national product on health care. Id. Japan
only spends 6.8% of its gross national product on health care. James Sterngold,
Japan's Health Care: Cradle, Grave and No Frills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992,
at Al, A8.
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uct (about $115 billion) on medical expenses for people in
their last six months of life."3 ' At least one study found that
"'the use of resources for dying patients exceeds resources
used for other high cost patients,' "32 and statistics kept by
the Massachusetts General Hospital have consistently shown
an inverse relationship between favorable prognosis and ex-
penditure."3 In sum, medical costs have jumped enormously,
mostly stemming from care of patients with little or no
chance of recovery.
B. Greater Acceptance of Suicide
The effect that modern technology has had in making
death a prolonged, painful, and costly process has caused us
to re-think our traditional views regarding suicide. Under
the common law, suicide was regarded as self-murder and
therefore was punishable as a felony.34 Statutes prohibiting
suicide and suicide assistance remain on the books in modern
jurisdictions, but it is now more common for the police to ig-
nore the matter or for courts to ignore statutory law and al-
low punishment to give way to policy.3 5
At least one court has explained suicide as traditionally
illegal because it is viewed as "irrational self-destruction."36
31. Flanigan, supra note 28, at Dl, D4. This article asserts that there is a
"tug of war" between older and younger generations for resources. Id. The eld-
erly are winning, currently using more than 25% of the federal budget, and
medical expenses will continue to force this number upwards. Id. The younger
generations, however, must sacrifice part of their paycheck for the elderly; it is
estimated that President Clinton's plan to mandate employer-paid health in-
surance premiums will take $1,000 from the annual paychecks of middle-class
people. Id.
32. Alexander, supra note 25, at 71 (quoting S.A. Schroeder, J.A. Showstack
& H.E. Roberts, Frequency and Clinical Description of High-Cost Patients in 17
Acute-Care Hospitals, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1979)).
33. Id. (citing Cullen, Ferrara, Briggs, Walker & Gilbert, Survival, Hospi-
talization Charges and Follow-up Results in Critically Ill Patients, 294 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1979); Silverman, The Therapeutic Intervention Scoring
System: An Application to Acutely Ill Cancer Patients, 3 CIuT. CARE MED. 222
(1975); Civetta, The Inverse Relationship Between Cost and Survival, 14 J.
SURG. RES. 265 (1973)).
34. See Victor G. Rosenblum, The Right to Assisted Suicide: Protection of
Autonomy or an Open Door to Social Killing?, 6 IssuEs L. & MED. 1, 6 (1990).
35. See Catherine D. Shaffer, Criminal Liability For Assisting Suicide, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 348, 371.
36. Bartling v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, at 226 (Ct. App. 1984) (em-
phasis added). Such language gives rise to the term "rational suicide." The
most vitriolic of critics contend that this term is an oxymoron: "The concept of
rational suicide is elusive and controversial .... It is not a thing to do while one
668 [Vol. 34
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Similarly, other courts have broadened the definition of a
non-suicidal death by no longer distinguishing between ex-
traordinary and ordinary care in medical cases. s7 Although
the prevention of suicide is still listed as a state interest, 8
modem courts are more accepting of what was once labeled,
and even punished, as suicide.3 9
C. Patient Autonomy as Opposed to Physician Control
Concurrently with the increased acceptance of suicide,
society and the courts have enlarged the individual's power to
make autonomous decisions. In accordance with modern bio-
ethics, the patient, not the doctor, controls what treatment he
or she will or will not receive. 40 Courts and legislatures re-
quire the physician to attain the patient's consent, 41 recog-
nize living wills"2 and durable powers of attorney for health
is not in one's best mind. Never kill yourself when you are suicidal." Yeates
Conwell, Rational Suicide and The Right to Die, NEW ENG. J. MED., 1100, 1101
(1991).
37. See Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 7-8. Ordinary means include all
medicines, treatments, and operations that offer a reasonable hope of benefit
and that can be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain, or other
inconvenience. John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective
Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 236 (1975). Extraordinary
means include all medicines, treatments, and operations, that cannot be ob-
tained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or that,
if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit. Id.
38. See Bartling v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1984).
39. Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 7-8. Rosenblum explains that the differ-
ence between ordinary and extraordinary treatment is the difference between
beneficial, relatively painless treatment and nonbeneficial, painful treatment.
Id. When one refuses ordinary treatment, he is committing suicide. Id. But
when one refuses extraordinary treatment, he is not committing suicide. Id.
Instead, he is "merely acquiescing in imminent and inevitable death by avoid-
ing a painful, nonbeneficial treatment." Id. at 8. Therefore, courts should con-
tinue to distinguish between the two in order to prevent the proliferation of
euthanasia and suicide. Id.
40. Dr. Ronald B. Miller, Lecture at Hoag Memorial Hospital (Oct. 23,
1992) (audio-cassette available in the library of Hoag Memorial Hospital, New-
port Beach, CA). See also HUMPHRY, supra note 13. Humphry explains that
"physicians are now more likely to be seen as 'friendly body technicians' and no
longer as the rulers of one's bodily health whose every piece of advice must be
interpreted as a command." Id. at 19.
41. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
42. A living will is a document in which a decisionally capable person ex-
presses in advance his or her wishes regarding medical treatment in the event
that he or she becomes decisionally incapable at some time in the future. Co-
ORDINATING COUNCIL ON LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION MAK-
ING, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE SUSTAINING MEDI-
CAL TREATMENT 187 (1992) [hereinafter MEDICAL TREATMENT]. As of May, 1992,
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care, 43 and allow the patient to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment. 4 Nonetheless, the law has yet to provide clear
principles to govern the cases in which patients seek to take
back control not only over their treatment, but over their
deaths.
D. Case Law
1. In Re Quinlan
The seminal case allowing for withdrawal of treatment,
or "passive euthanasia," is In re Quinlan.45 The Quinlan
court explored issues of guardianship,46 privacy,47 and reli-
gion 48 as well as issues concerning medical standards, physi-
cian liability, and the role of a court in these types of cases.49
The court ultimately held that a guardian could substitute
his or her judgment for an incompetent patient's judgment in
choosing to withdraw the patient's medical treatment. 50
Although the court noted that intervention by the judiciary
would be rare and minimal in these cases, it did recommend
the formation of medical ethics committees.51
Karen Ann Quinlan was a twenty-two-year-old adult
when she entered a "chronic persistent vegetative state."52
Although technically alive, she required a respirator in order
46 states and the District of Columbia had statutes authorizing living wills. Id.
at 8 n.22.
43. A durable power of attorney is similar to a typical power of attorney in
that a designated person is empowered to act on the patient's behalf. Id. at 185.
The "durable" element means that the power does not lapse if the patient be-
comes decisionally incapable. Id. Thus, durable powers of attorney allow one to
delegate medical decision-making authority. Id. As of May, 1992, 42 states and
the District of Columbia had statutes authorizing a durable health care power
of attorney. Id. at 9 n.25.
44. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977); Bouvia
v. Superior Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Ct.,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
45. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977).
46. Id. at 670-71.
47. Id. at 662-64.
48. Id. at 661-62.
49. Id. at 664-70.
50. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1977).
51. Id. at 672.
52. Id. at 654. One who is in a "chronic persistent vegetative state... 're-
mains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological func-
tion but no longer has any cognitive function.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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to assist her breathing, and her prognosis for recovery was
"extremely poor-she [would] never resume cognitive life."53
Karen was totally unaware of her surroundings, although she
developed "sleep-wake" cycles at which time she would blink
and cry out.5 '4 Karen's father, Joseph, was appointed guard-
ian and was granted power to authorize the removal of her
respirator.55
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized an unwrit-
ten constitutional right of privacy in both the New Jersey and
Federal Constitutions. The court held that this right of pri-
vacy governs a patient's decision to terminate medical treat-
ment in much the same way that it governs a woman's deci-
sion to terminate pregnancy.56
Since Karen's own right of privacy would allow her to or-
der treatment withdrawn were she not incompetent,5 7 the
court determined that her guardian and family were to
render their "best judgment ... as to whether she would exer-
cise [her right] in these circumstances."5  This is known as
"substitute judgment."59
Despite the guardian's efforts, the court concluded that
Ms. Quinlan's physicians had correctly refused to withdraw
treatment based on then-existing medical standards and
practices. 60 The court, however, refused to follow such medi-
cal standards, which it depicted as strongly influenced by the
53. Id. at 655.
54. Id. at 654.
55. The trial court denied him this power. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670
(N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977). The trial judge believed in bifur-
cation of guardianship whereby Mr. Quinlan could only attain guardianship
over his daughter's property, but not over her person. Id. at 670. Under the
principle of stewardship, guardianship over one's person is reserved for God.
Id. Such bifurcation of guardianship has "roots deep in the common law." Id.
56. Id. at 663 (citing N.J. CONST., art. I, par.1. (1947)).
57. Id. at 663-64.
58. Id. at 664.
59. "Substitute judgment" is a legal standard for surrogate decision-mak-
ing. MEDICAL TREATMENT, supra note 42, at 184, 187. By this standard, the
surrogate makes the decision on the basis of what is known about the patient's
personal values and preferences. Id. This is a more subjective standard than
the "best interests" standard, under which the surrogate makes the decision
from the point of view of a hypothetical "reasonable person" on the basis of ob-
jective, socially shared criteria. Id.
60. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1977).
1994]
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"modern proliferation of substantial malpractice litigation
and the possibility of criminal sanctions."6 1
As a solution to such fears of liability impeding a physi-
cian's work, the court authorized the establishment of hospi-
tal "ethics committees" or similar consultative bodies.62
Such bodies, the court reasoned, diffuse the professional re-
sponsibility for a decision.63 The court stated:
[S]uch a system would be protective to the hospital as well
as the doctor in screening out, so to speak, a case which
might be contaminated by less than worthy motivations of
family or physician. In the real world and in relation to
the momentous decision contemplated, the value of addi-
tional views and diverse knowledge is apparent.6 4
The Quinlan court concluded that judicial proceedings
would not necessarily be required in future cases.6 5 When
the judiciary does not interfere, the court noted, the doctor-
patient relationship is strongest.66 Moreover, the goal of a
quick resolution is hindered by the time-consuming judicial
process.67
Although the court stated that the judiciary would not
necessarily intervene in future cases, it did set some guide-
lines.68 The primary guideline focused on consensus between
the treating physician and the ethics committee. 69 As long as
the physicians and consultative body agreed that there would
be "no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from
her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient
state,"70 the life-support system could be withdrawn and
there would be no civil or criminal liability on the part of any
participant, including guardian, physician, hospital, or
others.7 1
61. Id. at 666-67.
62. Id. at 672.
63. Id. at 669.
64. Id.
65. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1977).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 672.
68. Id. at 666-69, 671, 672.
69. See id. at 671-72.
70. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 672 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1977).
71. Id.
672 (Vol. 34
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Thus, the Quinlan court allowed for a consultative body
to determine the possibility of a patient breaking out of a
coma. In the absence of such a "reasonable possibility," phy-
sicians may follow the decision of a patient's guardian who is
exercising "substituted judgment" in ordering the patient's
treatment withdrawn.72 The United States Supreme Court
refused to review the matter,73 and the controversy over the
"right to die" continued.74
2. Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health: The
Right to Die
The Supreme Court of the United States considered the
question of a constitutional "right to die" for the first time in
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health.75 In Cruzan, most
of the justices either acknowledged or assumed there is a
"right to die" under certain circumstances. 76 The right, how-
ever, was not considered absolute, and the Court ultimately
held that a state could require "clear and convincing" evi-
dence of a patient's wishes where a guardian is seeking to
discontinue nutrition and hydration.77
72. Id. at 671.
73. Id. at 672.
74. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 279.
77. Id. at 265. The "clear and convincing" standard for the withdrawal of
life support was formulated initially by the Missouri Supreme Court. Id. (quot-
ing Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)). The state
court created the standard after confronting the following unfortunate and un-
certain facts. Nancy Beth Cruzan was 25 years old when she suffered severe
injuries in an auto accident that left her in a persistent vegetative state.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266 n.1. See also supra note 52 for a description of"vegeta-
tive state.' When it became apparent that Nancy had no chance of regaining
her cognitive capacities, her parents sought to terminate her artificial nutrition
and hydration. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267. Despite the wishes of Nancy's par-
ents, the employees of the hospital demanded court approval before they would
discontinue the artificial feeding. Id. at 268. The Missouri trial court subse-
quently granted such approval and ordered the removal of Nancy's feeding
tube. Id. The trial court determined that no state interest could be found to
outweigh Nancy's "fundamental right" to direct the withdrawal of medical pro-
cedures, especially when that right was supplemented by her earlier conversa-
tions with a friend that she would not want to continue her life in such a state.
Id.
A closely divided Missouri Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial
court's ruling. Id. The court found Nancy's remarks to her friend "unreliable
for the purpose of determining her intent" and demanded "clear and convincing
evidence" of her wishes before they would allow her guardians to exercise "sub-
674 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
Writing the majority opinion for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited the common law doctrine of informed consent
to buttress the notion that a competent individual has a right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment when there is
clear and convincing evidence that his or her wish is to refuse
treatment. 8 The Court reasoned that this right, however,
springs not from one's right of privacy, as the Quinlan court
determined, but from a Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
est inferable from prior Supreme Court decisions. 9
Determining that one has a right based on liberty, how-
ever, does not end the inquiry; the next step is to balance the
individual's "'liberty interests against the relevant state in-
terests.' "80 The Court determined that a state has an "un-
qualified interest""' in protecting and preserving human
life.82 Moreover, the Cruzan majority reasoned that the state
should consider other interests besides the preservation of
life.8 3 Since the choice between life and death is a "deeply
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality,"8 4
the Court determined that Missouri could seek to safeguard
stituted judgment" on her behalf. Id. (quoting Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the ruling of
the Missouri Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision. Id. at 263. The Court
first agreed with the Missouri court's interpretation of its own state law in con-
cluding that Nancy was not dead, but was in a persistently vegetative state.
Id. at 266 (quoting Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411). Moreover, she was "not termi-
nally ill," and medical experts testified that she could have lived another 30
years. Id. at 267 n.1. She exhibited some motor reflexes, such as grimacing
from pain, but no significant cognitive functions. Id. at 266 n.1.
Interestingly, approximately 10,000 patients are being maintained in per-
sistent vegetative states in this country, and the number is expected to grow
significantly in the near future. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 575
(12th ed. 1991).
78. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273.
79. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (citing
Jacobson v. Massacusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)). While the trial court
termed the right a "fundamental" one, Rehnquist refused such language. The
Court does not protect liberty interests as strongly as it protects fundamental
rights, and Rehnquist's test, therefore, might be viewed as a lower-level scru-
tiny where an ad-hoc multifactor balancing test is required. See id.
80. Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
81. By "unqualified," Rehnquist meant that the state would not have to
make judgments about the "quality" of life that a particular individual may en-
joy. Id. at 282.
82. The Court found this state interest evidenced by the fact that the major-
ity of states have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another
to commit suicide. Id. at 280.
83. Id. at 271.
84. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
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abuses of that personal element of choice; "the state need not
remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary deci-
sion by a physically-able adult to starve to death."8 5 It was
constitutional, then, for Missouri to impose a heightened evi-
dentiary standard.
The state was allowed to protect its interests in preserv-
ing life and ensuring that a decision to die was personal by
requiring "clear and convincing evidence" that a competent
patient/person would have chosen to die.8 6 This standard of
proof reflects a "societal judgment about how the risk of error
should be distributed between litigants." 7 The Court went
on to rationalize its allocation of risk:
The more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear,
the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous deci-
sion. We believe that Missouri may permissibly place an
increased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to
terminate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining
treatment. An erroneous decision not to terminate results
in a maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of sub-
sequent developments such as advancements in medical
science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the pa-
tient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unex-
pected death of the patient despite the administration of
life-sustaining treatment, at least create the potential
that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its
impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of
correction.88
Missouri's "clear and convincing evidence" standard, up-
held in Cruzan, requires the individual's wishes to be ad-
duced from his or her statements while he or she was compe-
tent.89 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion stated that parents,
no matter how loving and caring, do not have a right of "sub-
stitute judgment"; there is no automatic assurance that a
family member's choice will match that of the patient.90
Despite the Court's rejection of "substituted judgment,"
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence in order to
85. Id. at 285.
86. Id. at 286-87.
87. Id. at 283.
88. Id.
89. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990).
90. Id.
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emphasize that the Court was not deciding conclusively
whether a state should abide by the "substituted judgment"
of a surrogate decision-maker. 91 She concluded that a state
may be constitutionally required to heed a surrogate in order
to protect a patient's liberty interest. 92 She also explained
that the Cruzan decision ruled only on the constitutionality of
one state's practices and that the "task of crafting appropri-
ate procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty inter-
ests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States."93
Justice Scalia's concurrence had a short message: "[T]he
federal courts have no business in this field."94 He reasoned
that "the Constitution has nothing to say about the subject"95
of suicide, which has traditionally been the business of the
state.96 He did proceed, however, to colorfully describe his
belief that there is no fundamental right to suicide, as as-
sisted suicide "is declared by the law to be murder, irrespec-
tive of the wishes or the condition of the party to whom the
poison is administered."97 Moreover, Scalia did not distin-
guish between active and passive euthanasia: "It would not
make much sense to say that one may not kill oneself by
walking into the sea, but may sit on the beach until sub-
merged by the incoming tide."98 He concluded that the Court
could no better decide this issue than "nine people picked at
random from the Kansas City telephone directory,"99 and
that "it is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide, through
their elected representatives, whether that wish will be
honored."100 The only constitutional limit on the state's in-
terest in requiring an individual to preserve his own life
would be the Equal Protection Clause, "which requires the
91. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 292 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
94. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,293 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
95. Id. at 300.
96. Id. at 293.
97. Id. at 296 (citing Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1873)).
98. Id. at 296.
99. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J.
concurring).
100. Id. at 293.
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democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved
ones what they impose on you and me."10 1
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, Justice O'Connor's clarifica-
tion, and Justice Scalia's deferential view were opposed in
two separate dissents by Justice Brennan (joined by Justice
Marshall and Justice Blackmun) and Justice Stevens. Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent found that Nancy Cruzan had a "fun-
damental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and
hydration."10 2 As with the interference with any fundamen-
tal right, the state should be subjected to a strict-scrutiny
standard by which the Court would ensure there is a compel-
ling state interest and that the statute is narrowly tailored to
effectuate only that interest. 10 3 Here, Justice Brennan found
there is not a compelling state interest:
Missouri does not claim, nor could it, that society as a
whole will be benefited by Nancy's receiving medical
treatment. No third party's situation will be improved
and no harm to others will be averted.
The only state interest asserted here is a general in-
terest in the preservation of life. But the State has no le-
gitimate general interest in someone's life, completely ab-
stracted from the interest of the person living that life,
that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical
treatment.
10 4
In sum, the lack of a sufficiently important state interest
would prove fatal when strictly scrutinized, and as Justice
Brennan described, Nancy was entitled to "die with
dignity."10 5
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, agreed that the state had
little interest in this matter. 10 6 He explained that the Court
should not distinguish life from liberty; that is,
[i]f Nancy Cruzan's life were defined by reference to her
own interests, so that her life expired when her biological
existence ceased serving any of her own interests, then
her constitutionally protected interest in freedom from
101. Id. at 300.
102. Id. at 302.
103. See id. at 302, 312-13, 317.
104. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 312-13 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (citation and footnotes omitted).
105. Id. at 302.
106. Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens wrote that the majority
erred in permitting the state's "abstract, undifferentiated interest in the preser-
vation of life to overwhelm the best interests of Nancy Beth Cruzan." Id.
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unwanted treatment would not come into conflict with her
constitutionally protected interest in life.10 7
In short, he determined that the patient's best interests
should prevail over any general state policy.
In their final analyses, all of the Cruzan Justices except
for Justice Scalia either acknowledged or assumed a "right to
die" in certain circumstances. The Court, however, neither
made an absolute right nor set forth an absolute test. In-
stead, the Court ruled that, under Nancy Cruzan's specific
facts, a state could require "clear and convincing evidence" of
a patient's wishes where a guardian seeks to discontinue nu-
trition and hydration.' 0 The Court, then, was willing to de-
fer to the state. In the next section, this comment examines
state-level determinations made by two California appellate
courts. 109
3. The California Cases: Bouvia and Bartling
The California appellate courts have been particularly
liberal in deferring to an individual's choice over the interests
of the state or any physician."10 These courts have stated
that "the patient's interests and desires are the key ingredi-
ents of the decision-making process .... [W]henever possible,
the patient himself should then be the ultimate deci-
sionmaker.""' For these courts, the motive of the patient is
irrelevant; "[i]f a right exists, it matters not what 'motivates'
its exercise."112
In Bartling v. Superior Court,1 13 a seventy-year-old pa-
tient who suffered from five different non-terminal diseases
requested that he be removed from a respiratory ventila-
107. Id. at 351.
108. Id. at 286-87.
109. The decisions reviewed are Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(Ct. App. 1986) and Bartling v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
110. The courts have based this deference on a right of privacy implicit in the
United States Constitution and explicit in the California Constitution. See CAL.
CONST. art. I § 1; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (cited in Bouvia, 225
Cal. Rptr. at 306).
111. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1972)). The patient's decision would not be subject to the approval of an ethics
committee: "We find nothing in the law to suggest the right to refuse medical
treatment may be exercised only if the patient's motives meet someone else's
approval" Id. at 306.
112. Id.
113. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
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tor.1 14 He had executed a "living will," a durable power of
attorney for health care, and a declaration stating his knowl-
edge of the consequences of turning off the ventilator.1 15 The
court held that the right of a competent adult to refuse medi-
cal treatment is protected under both the California and Fed-
eral Constitutions and must not be abridged." 6 The right to
have life-sustaining treatment discontinued is not limited to
patients who are comatose or terminally ill." 7 The court fur-
ther held that the right of Mr. Bartling, as a competent
adult,"18 to refuse unwanted medical treatment was not out-
weighed by any combination of the following state interests:
the preservation of life, the need to protect innocent third
parties, the prevention of suicide, and maintainence of the
ethics of the medical profession." 9
The same high level of deference to the individual led an-
other California appellate court to recognize Elizabeth
Bouvia's right to hasten her death by refusing medical treat-
ment despite the fact she was not terminally ill,' 20 had no
great physical discomfort,' 2' could have lived another fifteen
to twenty years on the life-sustaining equipment, 22 and had
lived with her cerebral palsy since birth. 23 Ms. Bouvia may
have also been influenced by depression resulting from a rash
of tragic events suffered immediately prior to her decision.'
24
Nonetheless, the court valued Bouvia's decision that her
existence had become meaningless and determined that "[i]f
her right to choose may not be exercised because there re-
mains to her, in the opinion of the court, a physician or some
committee, a certain arbitrary number of years, months, or
114. Id.
115. Id. at 221
116. Id. at 224-26.
117. Id. at 223.
118. The court deemed Mr. Bartling competent despite his vacillation before
making his final decision, his severe bouts of depression, and his alcoholism.
Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (Ct. App. 1984).
119. Id. at 224-26.
120. Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (Ct. App. 1986).
121. Id. at 299.
122. Id. at 304.
123. Id. at 299.
124. Ms. Bouvia had recently separated from her husband and had suffered
a miscarriage. Id. at 300. After the court decision, she changed her mind and
said she wanted to continue living. She has now refused removal of her naso-
gastric tube and continues living today. HUMPHRY, supra note 13, at 60.
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days, her right will have lost its value and meaning."125 The
court asked:
Who shall say what the minimum amount of available life
must be? Does it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20
months, or 15 to 20 days, if such life has been physically
destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone? As
in all matters lines must be drawn at some point, some-
where, but that decision must ultimately belong to the one
whose life is in issue. 126
The Bouvia court, like the Bartling court before it, deter-
mined that this was not a legal issue: The patient's right to
choose "is not a conditional right subject to approval by ethics
committees or courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical
decision that, being a competent adult, is [the patient's]
alone.,127
In his concurrence, Justice Compton expressed his dis-
gust with the fact that Bouvia had to go through the courts in
order to assert her absolute right. 12  He reasoned that if the
state had not threatened physicians with penal sanctions, the
process for Ms. Bouvia could have been much smoother, as
her physicians could have simply acted in accordance with
the Hippocratic Oath rather than acting in fear of potential
legal repercussions. 129 His reading of the Oath was such that
a doctor would effectuate a reasonable balance between his or
her own obligation to heal and his or her obligation to pre-
serve life. 130
125. Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (Ct. App. 1986).
126. Id. at 305.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 307-08 (Compton, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 308 (Ct. App. 1986(Compton, J., concurring). Justice Compton noted the precise language of the
Hippocratic Oath which states, "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if
asked." Id. (citation omitted). But, he believed that the Oath's portion about a
physician using his or her best abilities and judgments overrides that express
statement. Id. Commentator Richard Benton notes that perhaps the words of
the Oath are not to keep a physician from killing under all circumstances.
RicHARD G. BENTON, DEATH AND DYING 42 (1978) (quoting G. Cant, Deciding
When Death is Better than Life, TIME, July 26, 1973, at 36-37). In fact, the
words may have been designed initially "to keep the physician from becoming
an accomplice of palace poisoners or of a man seeking to get rid of a wife." Id.
680 [Vol. 34
PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING
The lesson of the California appellate court cases 131 is
that no criminal or civil liability will be imposed if a party
honors a competent, informed patient's refusal of medical ser-
vice. 132 But, the Bouvia court was quick to distinguish re-
fusal from affirmative or active euthanasia, which is "far dif-
ferent" from the mere omission of a doctor while his or her
patient asserts his or her constitutional rights.
133
E. The Next Step: Legalization of Physician-Assisted
Death
Because most of the justices on the Cruzan Court and the
California appellate courts, as well as a large segment of the
population, are receptive to passive euthanasia, this com-
ment analyzes the likely next step-active euthanasia in the
form of physician-assisted death. Over the past two years,
voters in Washington and California have narrowly defeated
initiatives that would make it legal for a physician to affirma-
tively aid his or her patient in dying.1 3 4  After the California
proposition was defeated, many felt that the voters were not
opposed to the overall concept of a physician aiding a patient
in dying, but they were simply opposed to the language of the
initiative. 135
1. Case in Point: California's Proposition 161
As with any proposition in California, the supporters of
Proposition 161 gained access to the ballot by collecting the
requisite number of petition signatures. The language
printed on the petition matched that of the ballot.136 Early
131. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 297; Bartling v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct.
App. 1983) (This case allowed a surrogate to choose withdrawal of treatment for
a comatose patient. The surrogate is to be guided either by the choice the pa-
tient would make if competent, or by the patient's best interests.). See also
supra note 59 for a definition of substitute judgment.
132. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 4.
135. Miranda Ewell, Voters Reject Controversial Measure, SAN JOSE MER-
cuRY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1992, at 17EL. See also CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET,
GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at 35 (1992).
136. As in the State of Washington, the authors of the California proposition,
Californians Against Human Suffering, had to resort to direct democracy. Phy-
sician-assisted suicide is most likely too controversial an issue for a representa-
tive to support before the legislature.
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polls showed that Proposition 161 would certainly pass,137
but as election day neared, the margin narrowed and the ini-
tiative was ultimately defeated by a margin of fifty-four to
forty-six percent.' 38 Traditionally liberal voting populaces
supported the initiative, while traditionally conservative
populaces did not.139
The authors of the Proposition clearly recognized people's
fears and made an attempt to respond to them. In the pream-
ble, the authors stated that the purpose of the Act was "to
provide mentally competent, terminally ill adults the legal
right to voluntarily request and receive physician aid-in-dy-
ing.' 40 They explained that such a right springs from one's
right of self-determination: "The right to choose to eliminate
pain and suffering, and to die with dignity at the time and
place of our own choosing when we are terminally ill is an
integral part of our right to control our own destinies."' 4'
This right of physician-assisted death was a response to
modern medical technology, which has artificially prolonged
life "beyond natural limits." 42 Such a prolongation of life
should be remedied because it caused the loss of dignity and
increased pain and suffering for both the patient and family
"while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to
the patient."1 43 In essence, the right of physician-assisted su-
icide was to make death as "painless, humane and dignified"
as possible.14 4
Such a right, however, would not be without limits. The
authors explained that the Proposition provided "solid protec-
tion against abuse."'4 5 In particular, the Proposition re-
quired that in order "to ensure that the rights of others are
137. See supra note 23.
138. See supra note 23.
139. Merely 39.7% of the voters in San Bernardino County and 41.8% of the
voters in Orange County voted in favor of the proposition. Ewell, supra note
135 at 17EL. In more liberal counties, clear majorities voted in favor of the
proposition: 60.8% in San Francisco and 56.3% in Santa Cruz. Id.
140. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WiTH DIGNITY AcT, § 2525.1 (1992).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The authors perceived physician-assisted death as a dignified re-
sponse; receiving aid-in-dying is not to be denigrated to the status of "suicide"
or "mercy killing." Id. §§ 2525.16, 2525.23.
144. Id. § 2525.1.
145. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at 34
(1992).
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not affected," 46 there would have to be: (1) a six-month ter-
minal condition; (2) a voluntary choice; and (3) two physicians
insulated from liability.
147
The Act required the patient to have a six-month termi-
nal condition, 148 defined in the proposed statute as "an incur-
able or irreversible condition which will ... result in death
within six months or less" as determined by two physicians,
one of whom is the patient's primary attending physician.
149
Once the patient was deemed to have a six-month terminal
condition, doctors could help implement his or her voluntary
choice to die.' 5 ° In an attempt to ensure the voluntariness of
the choice, the drafters required that the patient be (1) men-
tally competent and (2) free from coercive pressures.' 5'
The patient should be mentally competent when signing
a witnessed revocable directive requesting that a physician
aid him or her in death.'52 The Proposition did not define
mental competence, nor did it require the patient to undergo
a psychological examination.'5 3 Instead, the determination
of a patient's mental competence could be made by the pa-
tient's physicians, 5 regardless of their psychological train-
ing. The request by the patient must have been made on
more than one occasion (an "enduring"'55 request), but there
146. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WiTH DIGNITY ACT, § 2525.1 (1992).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 2525.2(j).
149. Id. The Voluntary Directive to Physicians, to be signed by the patient,
broadens the definition of terminal in order to include terminal conditions and
illnesses. Id. at 9. See also infra text accompanying notes 178-180 discussing
the possible implications of this broader definition.
150. CALIFoRNIAs AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH WrrH
DIGNITY ACT, Id. §§ 2525.4; 2525.9.
151. Id. §§ 2525.3; 2525.8; 2525.18.
152. Id.§ 2525.3 (1992).
153. Id. at § 2525.13. "An attending physician who is requested to give aid-
in-dying may request a psychiatric or psychological consultation if that physi-
cian has any concern about the patient's competence, with the consent of a qual-
ified patient." Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. (Since the physician is not required to seek a psychiatric or psycho-
logical evaluation of the patient, he or she presumably is left with the task of
judging a patient's competence. The Proposition does not discuss training the
physician in the art of psychological evaluation.)
155. Id. § 2525.2(i) ("Enduring request' means a request for aid-in-dying,
expressed on more than one occasion.").
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was not any required "cooling-off" period between such
requests. 156
To protect the patient from coercion, the Act tried to for-
bid "inducement" or "coercion" of the patient by family mem-
bers or insurance companies for whom the patient may have
become a burden. 157 To allay the voters' fears of coercion, the
Act provided:
No patient may be pressured to make a decision to seek
aid-in-dying because that patient is a financial, emotional,
or other burden to his or her family, other persons, or the
state. A person who coerces, pressures, or fraudulently
induces another to execute a Directive under this title is
guilty of a misdemeanor, or if death occurs as a result of
said coercion, pressure or fraud, is guilty of a felony.15
In addition, the processing of the directive and actual ad-
ministration of aid-in-dying could occur without any family
member witnessing or even having knowledge. 159
A similar section specifically addressed concerns regard-
ing insurance companies. 160 No insurance company could
change its rate structure or extension of coverage in response
to the insured's choice regarding physician-assisted death.161
No insurer could require or prohibit any person from execut-
ing a directive as a condition to being insured.' 62 Such a con-
ditional insurer would be guilty of a misdemeanor.1 63
Nonetheless, there was no provision for a reviewing med-
ical committee or advisory board to determine whether the
patient was competent and not under coercion. 164 In fact, the
final certification was to be made by two independent physi-
cians, one of whom was the patient's attending physician,
from any field of medicine, regardless of their level of train-
156. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at 35
(1992) (arguments against Proposition 161).
157. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT §§ 2525.17-2525.18 (1992).
158. Id. § 2525.18.
159. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at 35
(1992) (arguments against Proposition 161).
160. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT § 2525.17 (1992).
161. Id. § 2525.17(a).
162. Id. § 2525.17(b).
163. Id. § 2525.17(d).
164. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at 35
(1992) (arguments against Proposition 161).
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ing.165 These physicians purportedly would be immune from
liability.'66 In fact, all health care professionals acting in ac-
cordance with any part of Proposition 161 were purported to
be insulated from liability.'67 No claims of criminal liability
or unprofessional conduct would attach to the health care
provider who acted in accordance with "reasonable medical
standards in administering aid-in-dying." 68
As part of the reasonable physician's job, the Act would
have required a physician to certify that the directive was
properly executed and witnessed. 69 As treatment continued,
the physician would be required to determine whether the di-
rective had or had not been revoked in one of the three ways
specified by the Act.' 70 The physician would have to deter-
mine when it is necessary, based on written or oral state-
ments of his or her patient, to execute a new directive.'
71
Once the procedure took place, the physician would list
the underlying illness as the cause of death. 72 Hospitals
would be required to make annual reports to the state depart-
ment of health services regarding the total number of cases,
the patient's age, and the type of illness. 73 No record would
tie the occurrence of the procedure to the individual.
74
Proposition 161's requirements were varied and complex.
The validity of each requirement, or safeguard, is a matter of
165. "'Attending physician' means the physician selected by, or assigned to,
the patient who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the
patient." CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT § 2525.2(a) (1992). "'Physician' means a physician and sur-
geon licensed by the Medical Board of California." Id. § 2525.2(e).
166. Id. § 2525.9.
167. Id. ("No physician, health care facility, or employee of a health care fa-
cility who, acting in accordance with the requirements of this title, administers
aid-in-dying to a qualified patient shall be subject to civil, criminal, or adminis-
trative liability therefore.").
168. Id. § 2525.15.
169. Id. § 2525.14.
170. A directive could be revoked at any time, without regard to the patient's
mental state or competency, by any of the following methods: (1) mutilation of
the paper on which it was written, (2) written revocation expressing an intent
to revoke, or (3) oral communication expressing an intent to revoke. Id.
§ 2525.5.
171. Id. § 2525.5 (1992).
172. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
PROPOSITION 161: THE CALIFORNIA DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 11 (1992).
173. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY AcT § 2525.21 (1992).
174. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
PROPOSITION 161: THE CALIFORNIA DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 11 (1992).
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debate. The following section analyzes these legal require-
ments before examining the constitutionality and dangers of
legalized physician-assisted death.
III. ANALYSIS
Views about choice are most likely to mirror views about
physician-assisted death. At one extreme are those who be-
lieve a choice to short-circuit life is never valid, and these
people will never accept physician-assisted death.175 At the
other extreme are those who strongly favor an individual's
freedom of choice and will accept this choice under almost all
circumstances. For these people, there is a presumptive va-
lidity that the choice to pursue a physician's aid-in-dying is a
free choice; potentially influential factors, such as the desire
to avoid high medical costs and becoming a burden on one's
family, will not disqualify the choice. 176
Presumably, most of the California voters fall somewhere
between these extremes. While some of those who opposed
the initiative fell within the extreme group arguing that this
practice should never be allowed, many of the opponents
questioned the procedure based on the lack of precise lan-
guage and safeguards that could serve to protect the efficacy
and voluntariness of the decision.177 A more carefully drafted
statute with more significant safeguards would probably
compel this group to vote in favor of a proposition for the le-
galization of physician-assisted death. This section analyzes
these concerns and the probable judicial response.
175. Religious groups are strongly opposed to active euthanasia. See Rabbi
Mark S. Miller, Rosh Hashanah Sermon (Oct. 23, 1992) (Temple Bat Yam, New-
port Beach, CA) (transcript available in the library of Temple Bat Yam).
176. How free a choice can be is really a matter of philosophical debate. A
Marxist view that the individual's choice is a product of the social institutions
around him precludes the conclusion that there is any free choice. On the other
hand, there are those who discount such quasi-Calvinistic thought and believe
the individual does have control in making a free choice. See June R. Carbone,
The Role of Contract Principles in Determining The Validity of Surrogacy Con-
tracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 593 n.44 (1988) (citing Margaret Jane Ra-
din, Market Alienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1932-33 (1987)). This com-
ment addresses the belief that our social institutions and practices can be
shaped in order to properly influence one's decisions.
177. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at
35 (1992) (arguments against Proposition 161).
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A. The Legal Requirements of Proposition 161
Presumably, most of the legal requirements of Proposi-
tion 161 were formulated with the wary voter in mind. While
the vote fell short for this Proposition, perhaps the right mix
of safeguarding requirements could sway the voters to ap-
prove a new proposition in a forthcoming election. To formu-
late this "right mix," one should first analyze the logic and
political attractiveness of the various legal requirements.
1. The Requirement of a Six-Month Terminal
Condition
There are quite a few loopholes in the language requiring
a six-month terminal condition. 17 First, although the Propo-
sition simply refers to a terminal condition, the directive the
patient must sign refers to either a "terminal condition or ill-
ness."' 79 This inconsistency, as well as the generally ambigu-
ous statutory language, leads one to wonder whether the phy-
sicians determining that a patient is to die within six months
are to make their estimate considering that the patient is re-
ceiving life-sustaining treatment or without considering such
life-prolonging treatment.
Second, the Act does nothing to stop courts from ex-
tending this procedure to non-terminal patients. Certainly
one of the greatest fears the Proposition's opponents have is
the extension of this procedure to non-terminal patients.
Although "terminal" is the listed requirement, the stated
objectives of the Act are "death with dignity" and "avoidance
of pain."' 80 Such objectives require the Act to encompass a
broader group than just the terminally ill. For instance, the
disabled, and those with Alzheimer's disease, would then
have to be covered if the drafters' stated objective were the
true objective.
Instead of drafting requirements in tune with their true
objective, the authors make an arbitrary categorization: ter-
minal within six months. Presumably, this is done to please
the wary voter. Most likely, however, the hope of the initia-
tive supporter is to break through the stigma against active
euthanasia and make it socially acceptable so that eventually
178. See supra text accompanying notes 148-150.
179. See CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
wrrH DIGNITY AcT 9 (1992).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 142-144.
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other people besides the terminally ill can exercise voluntary
euthanasia.' 8' A physician's aid-in-dying could become the
"reasonable standard" rather than the rare exception. 182
2. The Requirement of a Voluntary Choice
As noted, the stated purpose of Proposition 161 was "to
provide mentally competent, terminally ill adults the legal
right to voluntarily request and receive physician aid-in-dy-
ing."'8 3 The authors of Proposition 161 emphasized the vol-
untariness of the procedure for both physicians and pa-
tients.1 4 Yet, there is serious doubt as to whether the
safeguards requiring mental competence" 5 and forbidding
coercion'8 6 would adequately ensure that a patient's choice is
voluntary.
a. Mental Competence
The very nature of degenerative illnesses brings into
question whether a "competent" choice can ever be made.
One can easily argue that it is ridiculous to speak of "compe-
tence" when the patient has recently been diagnosed with a
terminal illness because the mental distress of such an event
precludes rational thought. To be competent is to be "ade-
quate for the purpose."' 87 The mental distress one suffers
after a diagnosis of terminal illness can make him inade-
quate, at least temporarily, for the purpose of determining
whether to end his life. Psychological elements-depression,
hopelessness, and delirium-certainly influence one's
thoughts, and some argue that "suicidal ideation is limited to
those who are significantly depressed.' u88
181. HUMPHRY, supra note 13, at 140 (1991) (explaining that others contend
physician-assisted death for Alzheimer's patients is justified); cf Mary Ann
Seawell, Historian: Stop Abetting Suicide for Disabled People, STANFORD OB-
SERVER, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 12 (fearing the inclusion of physical disabilities
within the term "terminal illness").
182. Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 29-31.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141.
184. In the Act's declaration of purpose, the authors mention the word "vol-
untary" no fewer than four times. See CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFER-
ING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH wiTH DIGNITY AcT § 2525.1 (1992).
185. Id. §§ 2525.2(h), 2525.3.
186. Id. §§ 2525.8, 2525.18.
187. AMERCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 271 (New College ed. 1980).
188. Kathleen M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Manage-
ment to Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 294 (1991).
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In addition to the mental factors, physical factors such as
pain could interfere with one's competence. If untreated, per-
sistent physical pain will surely affect a patient's view about
the quality of his life and, in turn, will influence his choice
about suicide or physician-assisted suicide. As observed,
"[o]ne common statement made by patients is that their pain
is so severe that they are unable to deal with the issue of mor-
tality, interfering with their ability to develop coping mecha-
nisms to deal with the dying process." 18 9 Those arguing that
competence is impossible to achieve after a diagnosis that one
is terminally ill will argue that those patients who did not
make an advanced directive are never qualified to make a
choice regarding physician-assisted suicide. To these people,
competence is the key to making a decision regarding the de-
cision to end one's own life.190 It would follow, then, that the
decision would have to be made before the diagnosis of termi-
nal illness. 9 '
Although there are those who believe competence is the
key, the modern approach, as supported by California case
law, seems to minimize its importance. For example, the
Bartling court determined that a depressed alcoholic, who
vacillated in his choice to die, was still mentally competent at
the point he decided to withdraw treatment. 92 In accordance
with the California courts' de-emphasis on competence, Prop-
osition 161 would not have required any psychological exami-
nation; the physician's analysis would be sufficient in deter-
mining a patient's competence.' 93 California courts have not
been overly concerned with the issue of competence.
The California courts, then, equate consciousness with
competence. To speak of competence as a strict safeguard is a
fallacy, because the California courts are likely to deem any
choice made by a conscious patient to be a competent
189. Id. at 294.
190. But cf. HEIFETZ & MANGEL supra note 1 (arguing that a determination
of competence will be too broad-sweeping and that one should never be denied
physician-assisted death simply because he or she is deemed incompetent).
191. Through the living will and durable power of attorney, most states al-
low such an advanced decision for treatment withdrawal. See supra notes 42-
43.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 113-119.
193. Ordinary physicians, however, lack training in psychology and are tra-
ditionally poor at making such determinations. Dr. Ronald B. Miller, Lecture
at Hoag Memorial Hospital (Oct. 23, 1992) (audio-cassette available in the li-
brary of Hoag Memorial Hospital, Newport Beach, CA).
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choice. 194 Further, one need not even be conscious, because a
third-party surrogate can make the choice for him or her.'95
i. The Third-Party Surrogate Decision
As a matter of course, medical personnel, friends, or fam-
ily make judgments for the incompetent patient that are sub-
stituted for those judgments the patient would have made if
competent. But the doctrines of "substituted judgment" and
"best interests" compel the third party to implement exactly
what that particular patient or a hypothetical reasonable pa-
tient would choose under the particular circumstances of the
particular illness. 196 The argument in favor of surrogate de-
cision-making is that the patient's "right to choose" will be
lost if a third party is not allowed to implement it for the
patient. 197
Nonetheless, there are strong arguments against surro-
gate decision-making. It is not a true exercise of choice. As
Professor Rosenblum observed, "the sine qua non of a right to
'choose' anything is cognitive ability to choose." 198 The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court attacked the doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment as a legal fiction and a "cruel charade." 99
The court stated:
The substituted judgment doctrine fails to recognize that
a competent patient makes a medical decision with re-
spect to a particular treatment, at a particular time, with
relation to how it affects his particular condition. This
cannot be truly substituted by reliance on vague, usually
remote, statements made by the person at a different time
and place, in a different condition, without regard to any
particular treatment. This is especially so with state-
ments made in the peak of health. What is clear on a mo-
ment's reflection is that people change their minds about
194. See Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); see also
Bartling v. Super. Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984).
195. See supra note 59. California follows the "best interests" standard for
surrogate decision-making. Barber v. Super. Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App.
1983).
196. See supra note 59.
197. Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 19.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 18 (quoting In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 724 (Mass. 1982) (Nolan,
J., dissenting).
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treatment, depending on the time and their condition and
the treatment.2 °°
Although Proposition 161 did not include a provision re-
garding surrogates, it is important to discuss surrogates here
because their role will certainly be vital if such legislation is
passed. While California's Natural Death Act 201 provides
only for withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in instances
of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition,
the courts have readily extended such withdrawal to non-ter-
minal, conscious patients.20 2
Similarly, the courts might ignore the distinction be-
tween a terminal/non-terminal or conscious/non-conscious
patient in allowing for third-party decisions in the area of
physician-assisted suicide. Proposition 161 does nothing to
ensure that a court will make the proper distinctions, nor
does it ensure that third parties will be barred from ordering
a physician to affirmatively aid in the patient's death. In
sum, the California courts do not strictly require competence,
and any voter believing that mental competence is a strict
requirement or that third parties are excluded from the pro-
cess has been tricked by the language of Proposition 161.
Similarly, the next section demonstrates how the promise of a
coercion-free procedure is equally flawed.
b. Coercive Pressures on the Patient
Despite the drafters' linguistic forays regarding a lack of
coercion of the patient,20 3 no amount of safeguarding lan-
guage can make physician-assisted death a coercion-free pro-
cedure. The mere legality of such physician aid-in-dying is
coercive in itself. When patient A seeks aid-in-dying, that pa-
tient's decision may have an effect on the decision of patient
B lying in the next hospital bed. When patient B sees that
the health care professionals are freed from the burden of
caring for patient A and that patient A's family is free to go
on with their lives instead of making daily visits to the dying
relative, he or she may be affected. Certainly it can be de-
bated whether there is justice in the health care professionals
200. Id. at 19.
201. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5 (West 1991).
202. See Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); see also
Bartling v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1984).
203. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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and family being freed from their burden, but to make the
assertion that the process is coercion-free is preposterous:
Will we not sweep up, in the process, some who are not
really tired of life, but think others are tired of them;
some who do not really want to die, but who feel they
should not live on, because to do so when there looms the
legal alternative of euthanasia is to do a selfish or cow-
ardly act? Will not some feel an obligation to have them-
selves 'eliminated' in order that funds allocated for their
terminal care might be better used by their families, or
financial worries aside, in order to relieve their families of
the emotional strain involved? 0 4
One may be inclined to dispose of this argument because any
decision is based on outside factors such as courage, money,
and the effect on loved ones. But one can envision dispropor-
tionate use by the poor, because their decisions may be af-
fected more by the cost of care.205 Moreover, the decision
here is an irrevocable one, so external forces affecting one's
thought process must be minimized.
It is wrong for the drafters to assert that the patient
makes her choice alone. The patient will, at the least, con-
verse generally about the procedure with her family. Mere
mention of cutting short the dying relative's life will certainly
strain the family-patient relationship, which in turn will af-
fect the decision-making process. Moreover, the family mem-
bers may not be in their clearest states of mind at this time:
[I]f the patient is maintained at home, many frustrations
and physical demands may be imposed on the family by
the advanced illness. There may develop extreme weak-
ness, incontinence and bad odors. The pressure of caring
for the individual under these circumstances is likely to
204. Yale Kamisar, Euthanasia Legislation: Some Non-Religious Objections,
in VOLUNTARY EuTHANSIA 110, 120 (A.B. Downing ed., 1986).
205. The poor may make for the hardest cases as they do not employ estate
planners who direct them to file durable powers of attorney and living wills
before the onset of problems. While the wealthy may be able to mandate physi-
cian aid-in-dying in an anticipatory directive, the poor will be left to use the
voluntary directive. The directive, however, occurs only after the onset of
problems. At that point, it will be more likely that one's competence is called
into question than if the directive had been made before the onset of problems.
Thus, it may be possible that the poor could be more restricted in their desire
for physician aid-in-dying.
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arouse a resentment and, in turn, guilt feelings on the
part of those who have to do the nursing.
20 6
The notion that "bad odors" will cause the family to pressure
their relative into terminating his life may appear extreme at
first glance, but weakness, incontinence, and bad odors can
be humiliating and harrowing because they signify one's loss
of bodily control. For many patients, such developments in
the context of a fatal illness represent a significant loss of dig-
nity that may be the tipping point for them and their fami-
lies. One cannot deny that the stresses and strains of sick-
ness are a burdensome reality in need of some amelioration.
A lethal injection, however, may be too accessible and too ex-
treme a solution.
Not only is the family a concern, but so is the insurance
company. The authors of Proposition 161 claimed that their
initiative would be insulated from insurance structures.2 °7
Yet, it is a truism that insurance policies influence our ac-
tions. One area in which the insurance company could have
particular influence is in defining the reasonable medical
standards a physician must follow when administering physi-
cian aid-in-dying.
Suppose a patient lives only five months after being diag-
nosed as terminally ill, and the doctor, in the insurance com-
pany's mind, did not advise clearly and convincingly enough
on physician aid-in-dying. The insurance company may at-
tempt to recover damages from the physician for the "super-
fluous" medical costs of those five months. What is even more
likely is that insurance companies will compose rate sched-
ules that set fixed prices for treatment of a given illness. For
those illnesses where physician-assisted suicide is a legal al-
ternative, rates will be set low enough to create an incentive
for hospitals and physicians to encourage physician-assisted
death. These are just a few of the ways in which insurance
companies could coerce physicians into giving stronger advice
on physician aid-in-dying. Insurance companies, then, may
have a large role in framing the next section's topic: reason-
able medical standards.
206. Kamisar, supra note 204, at 121 (citing Zarling, Psychological Aspects
of Pain in Terminal Malignancies, in MANAGEMENT OF PAIN IN CANCER 211,
211-12 (Schiffrin ed. 1956)).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 160-163.
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3. The Requirements of the Physician: Medical
Standards and Immunity
As noted previously, Proposition 161 provided that a pa-
tient is qualified to receive a physician's aid-in-dying after
she has been diagnosed as having a terminal condition by any
two physicians, as long as one is the patient's attending phy-
sician.20 The Act purported to immunize a physician from
civil, criminal, or administrative liability if she acts in accord-
ance with the Act. No physician is to be required to take any
action contrary to "reasonable medical standards."2 °9
a. The Two Physicians
Proposition 161 required that two physicians certify the
patient's request to die.210 The attending physician is re-
quired to certify the patient's wishes, presumably because
that physician knows the patient best.21 ' As she has re-
mained with and followed the development of the patient's
sickness, she will be best qualified to determine whether or
not the patient is making a competent, informed choice.
The attending physician, however, is not a calculating
robotic mechanism of objectivity. Instead, the physician is af-
fected by the stresses and strains and emotional attachments
that develop over the course of dealing with a patient's ill-
ness. Certainly a physician's own depression resulting from
feelings of failure will affect her decision to certify the pa-
tient's directive.2 12 At least one study shows a correlation be-
tween the physician's level of involvement with the patient
and her willingness to accept suicide by that patient.213
208. See supra text accompanying notes 165-167.
209. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HUMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT § 2525.15 (1992).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 165-166.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 165-166.
212. One commentator noted:
[A] doctor may react more emotionally and less objectively than in any
other area of medical practice. His deep concern may make him more
pessimistic than is necessary. As a result of the feeling of frustration
in his wish to help, the doctor may have moments of annoyance with
the patient. He may even feel almost inclined to want to avoid this
type of patient.
Kamisar, supra note 204, at 122 (citing Zarling, Psychological Aspects of Pain in
Terminal Malignancies, MANAGEMENT OF PAIN IN CANCER 211, 213-214 (1956)).
213. Lee Slome, et al., Physicians' Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide in
AIDS, 5 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 712 (1992).
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There may be a further problem in that neither of the
two physicians need be an expert in working with the termi-
nally ill. The only hurdle is that one physician must be li-
censed by the California Medical Board.2 14 It takes no great
stretch of the imagination to envision a system where below-
average or young doctors are attracted to this potentially lu-
crative practice:
If the range of skill and judgment among licensed physi-
cians approaches the wide gap between the very best and
the very worst members of the bar-and I have no reason
to think it does not-then the minimally competent physi-
cian is hardly the man to be given the responsibility for
ending another's life.215
Tracking statistical data, such as which physicians are most
inclined to offer the aid-in-dying, will be difficult.216 The re-
porting requirements of the Act are minimal,217 and there
will be no way to tie the occurrence of the procedure to an
individual patient or physician.
A further problem is that physicians must make legal de-
terminations. The physician will have to determine when it
is necessary, based on written or oral statements of his pa-
tient, to execute a new directive. 218 Not all physicians will
take time away from their medical studies or practice to learn
the subtleties of the Act in order to make the proper legal
determinations.
The obvious alternative is to allow only specially trained
and licensed physicians to certify and carry out the proce-
dure. Limiting the number of certified practitioners would
facilitate the state's role as watchdog. Training these physi-
cians on everything from the legal requirements of the Act to
how to psychologically evaluate a patient would make it more
likely that the Act's requirements were followed. Proposition
161, however, does not require or even suggest such training.
Certainly, a physician will need to learn how to advise his
patient, how to determine his patient's competence, and how
214. See supra note 165.
215. Kamisar, supra note 204, at 124.
216. See Alexander, supra note 25, at 67. Professor Alexander comments on
the difficulty in attaining statistical data for patients who have had treatment
withdrawn. Id. at 69.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 172-174.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 170-171.
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to best estimate what diseases will likely kill a person within
six months.
The problem with requiring a special license, however, is
that the patient's primary physician may not be licensed.
This results in a loss of the intimate doctor-patient relation-
ship that our society encourages. The license requirement
would leave the unlicensed physician without the flexibilty
and access to all treatments needed in order to be a full-ser-
vice health care provider. As the physicians' activities are
limited, their patients' respect will wane.
Allowing any two generally licensed physicians to carry
out the aid-in-dying is improper. We must limit the number
of physicians engaging in this new practice and make sure
they are properly trained in the proper legal and medical re-
quirements. Any detrimental effect on the intimacy of the
doctor-patient relationship will be minimal in relation to the
benefits gained in having a limited set of knowledgeable prac-
titioners carrying out a patient's desire to end his or her life.
After their training, these practitioners will be held accounta-
ble for their failure to act in accordance with the set of "rea-
sonable medical standards" they have learned.
b. Reasonable Medical Standards
The Act sets questionable medical standards. First, it is
unreasonable for a physician to estimate the length of one's
life; it is practically a clich6 for a patient to survive beyond
any estimation made by his physician. Second, it is improper
for a physician to declare his patient unworthy of further
treatment, because the physician's traditional role is to strive
constantly to find a cure for that which has previously been
deemed incurable. 21 9  Third, it is unclear whether a physi-
cian must disclose the availability of the procedure. Non-dis-
closure would emasculate the statute, but required disclosure
would certainly interfere with the doctor-patient relation-
ship, as the patient is certain to view his situation and his
physician differently after the physician brings up the
topic. 220 Finally, although the Act calls for physicians to act
219. See Kamisar, supra note 204, at 125. The counter to this argument is
that one who seeks aid-in-dying will be so far into his disease that a general
cure for his disease could still not solve his ailment. Id. at 126.
220. See David L. Llewellyn, Jr., Is Proposition 161 a License to Kill?, OR-
ANGE CouNrY LAw., Nov. 1992, at 20.
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in accordance with reasonable medical standards, the lesson
of past cases is that the medical profession will heed court-
approved standards. 221  A forecast of the court standards,
then, is in order.
c. Physician Liability: The Role of the Courts
Proposition 161 claimed to immunize the physician from
any sort of liability.222 In light of the "modern proliferation of
substantial malpractice litigation and the . . . possibility of
"223tcriminal sanctions, as well as the courts' involvement in
the withdrawal cases, it is difficult to trust such broad-sweep-
ing immunization. The courts will most likely fail to keep
their hands off this area.
Assuming that the Act, if passed, is deemed valid under
both the California and Federal Constitutions, there are vari-
ous legal causes of action that could be brought to challenge
the Act. Considering the requirement that physicians follow
unspecified "reasonable" medical standards, such as deter-
mining a patient's competence and precisely estimating when
a patient has six months to live, the physician's role is "decep-
tively risky."224 First, an allegation that the physician failed
to act "in accordance with" the Act subjects him or her to
criminal prosecution or civil liability.225 The doctor, hospital,
and support personnel could be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion for homicide or assisted suicide. The civil litigation could
encompass wrongful death, medical malpractice, and breach
of fiduciary duty.226 Interestingly enough, a "wrongful living"
tort could be brought against the physician who fails to prop-
erly disclose the availability of the procedure.227 Regulatory
proceedings could also subject the physician to penalties
against medical licenses and hospital privileges. Assuming
the Act is upheld as constitutional, then, the road for physi-
cians and health care professionals will not be liability-free.
221. See supra note 11. The withdrawal-of-treatment cases reached the
courts because physicians acted in accordance with their medical standards,
and the patient requested that the court modify these standards.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 166-168.
223. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666-67 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1977).
224. Llewellyn, supra note 220, at 26.
225. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HuMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT § 2525.9 (1992).
226. Llewellyn, supra note 220, at 26.
227. See Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 27-28.
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This assumption of constitutionality is further explored in
the next section.
B. The Constitutionality of the Act: The Bouvia and
Bartling Standard
The primary difference between the withdrawal of treat-
ment taking place in the Bouvia and Bartling courts and phy-
sician-assisted death is that the former allows the natural dy-
ing process to take place, while the latter short-circuits the
dying process. Whether or not the courts will accept a statu-
tory legalization of active euthanasia is a matter of specula-
tion, but it is most likely that they would. California courts
tend to follow statutory law in the "right to die" area, support
patient autonomy, and may ultimately heed the Act's lan-
guage declaring that physician-assisted death is not sui-
cide.228 The strength or lack of strength in the safeguards
would probably be deemed immaterial.
The courts have shown a tendency to follow the policy of
statutory law. In the Bouvia and Bartling cases, the courts
were swayed by the policy of California's Natural Death
Act.229 In fact, the Natural Death Act would buttress the ar-
gument in favor of Proposition 161, as it provides that adult
persons have a "fundamental right to control the decisions re-
lating to the rendering of [their] own medical care."23° On the
other hand, one could argue that the courts were not willing
to rule in favor of withdrawal only because to rule otherwise
would allow intrusions into one's constitutional right of pri-
vacy.231 No such intrusions exist, however, in the case of vol-
untary active euthanasia.
Using the statutory law as well as the California Consti-
tution, the courts have supported a patient's rights of auton-
omy.232 As a caveat, however, the statutes that the courts
rely on to assert a patient's rights of control have considered
228. CALIFORNINS AGAINST HuMAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT § 2525.16 (1992).
229. See Bartling v. Super. Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Ct. App. 1984); see
also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7186 (West 1991). The underlying
policy of this Act was to allow for withdrawal of treatment.
230. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5 (West 1991).
231. CAL. CONST. art I, § 1.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 110-133.
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only refusal of treatment,233 but say nothing about active eu-
thanasia. Despite the failure of the statutes to explicitly
mention active euthanasia, the courts would most likely con-
tinue to support a patient's right to autonomy.
Although the courts have been guided by the policies of
state statutes and a patient's right to choose, they are still
opposed to suicide. The Bouvia court reiterated that it is a
crime to aid in suicide, and any affirmative conduct that al-
lows another to kill himself is "far different" than the mere
presence of a doctor while treatment is withdrawn.23 4  The
Bouvia court refused to dwell on the suicide issue, and we
cannot be sure whether "far different" applies to physician
aid-in-dying so as to make it unconstitutional.
The Bartling court pointed out that the states have tradi-
tionally made suicide illegal in order to prevent "irrational
self-destruction."235 It would be simple for that court to ar-
gue, then, that the procedure in accordance with Proposition
161 is rational and therefore justified. After all, the purpose
of the safeguards' requiring an enduring request and a com-
petent patient is to make the decision to seek physican-as-
sisted death look like a rational decision, which as the draft-
ers are quick to point out, is therefore "not suicide."236
It is preposterous to declare that physician-assisted
death is not suicide; the patient intends to die and "sets the
death producing agent in motion with the intent of causing
his own death."237 But a court using the Bartling analysis
may overlook that and deem this type of suicide rational.
Although the courts have repeatedly shown a distaste for sui-
cide, their tendency to abide by state statutes and support a
233. The Natural Death Act asserts that a patient has a fundamental right
to control medical decisions "including the decision to have life-sustaining pro-
cedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185.5 (West 1991). California's Administrative
Code asserts that a patient is to actively participate in medical decisions and "to
the extent permitted by law, this includes the right to refuse treatment." CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70707(6) (West 1991).
234. Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986).
235. Bartling v. Super. Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis
added).
236. CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HumAN SUFFERING, THE CALIFORNIA DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT § 2525.16 (1992).
237. Bartling, 209 Cal.Rptr. at 226 (quoting Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)).
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patient's choice may outweigh any case against the "rational"
type of suicide proposed by Proposition 161.
Once the courts accept the general procedure, it is un-
likely that they will be bothered by arguments that a patient
lacked mental competence or that coercive pressures existed.
As noted, the Bartling court was not influenced by Mr.
Bartling's vacillation, depression, or alcoholism.238 In
Bouvia, the court was forthright in admitting that one's mo-
tive is irrelevant: "if a right exists, it matters not what 'moti-
vates' its exercise."23 Hence, if there is a right to physician-
assisted death, the court will not delve deeply into the issues
of mental competence and coercive pressures.
240
Similarly, courts may not even be bothered by active eu-
thanasia in the case of non-terminal illnesses. Just as they
went beyond the statutory language in Bouvia and Bartling
to allow withdrawal of treatment for competent, non-terminal
patients, 241 they may allow physician-assisted death for the
same. After all, it would be deemed hypocritical to argue that
a lethal injection is less humane than the legal method of a
slow, painful death after the withdrawal of treatment.242
Of course, relying on the language of these cases could be
dangerous, as active euthanasia is so different from passive
euthanasia that the rule of stare decisis may not apply.
Moreover, the most learned judges have been known to mold
their rationales to the facts before them, and in the face of a
procedure that so drastically diverges from the practices in
almost every jurisdiction in the world, they may reserve the
right to formulate a new rationale that fits their ultimate
conclusion. Perhaps judges will realize the danger of physi-
cian aid-in-dying243 and will then take time to analyze the
238. See supra text accompanying notes 113-119.
239. Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986).
240. Once physician-assisted death is accepted as a right or a quasi-right,
any imposed limits would be viewed as arbitrary. See Rosenblum, supra note
34, at 26. Compare the abortion area, in which the procedure was initially pro-
posed only for the "hard cases" (rape, incest, gross genetic defect, and preserva-
tion of the mother's life), but soon reached far beyond; "hard cases" make up
less than five percent of the 1.5 million abortions performed annually in the
United States. Id. at 8 (quoting Torres.& Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abor-
tions? 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169 (1988)).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 110-133.
242. Rosenblum, supra note 35 at 24.
243. See discussion infra part III.C.
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possibility of alternatives such as hospice care24 4 and advi-sory boards245 before making a final conclusion.
C. The Danger of Physician Aid-in-Dying
Although the abstract principle of allowing a dying pa-
tient to be freed from a painful, undignified life is attractive,
making a specific proposal is something else altogether.
When the authors of such a proposal fail to take care in its
drafting, and the courts will interpret the language broadly
so as to affect more than just those mentioned in the legisla-
tion, care must be taken.
The argument that there will be an inevitable extension
of a broadly tailored policy on physician aid-in-dying has been
termed the "wedge principle" or the "parade of horrors objec-
tion."246 One author uses pre-Nazi Germany to show a soci-
ety where movies and books were used to convince people to
accept euthanasia for the severly and chronically sick.247
Such acceptance, the author surmises, desensitized people
and made possible the eventual atrocities of the Nazis.248
Although this argument may shock some as extreme and ab-
errational, the importance of valuing and respecting the
existence of life for all groups cannot be denied.
Three groups in particular are potentially subject to
abuse: the disabled, the elderly, and the financially disad-
vantaged. One disabled historian points out that "equating
disability with terminal illness reflects not a person's medical
condition but their devaluated social status."249 It has also
been pointed out that many of the elderly who wish to die
would not wish to die if we made an effort to touch them: "II]f
we were to encourage their suicide, it would abrogate our re-
sponsibility to eliminate the reasons for such despair."25 °
Respectful measures, as proposed in the next section, must be
taken to help the disabled and elderly improve their situa-
tions before we do nothing more than act to terminate such
undesirables.
244. See discussion infra part IV.A.
245. See discussion infra part IV.B.
246. See Kamisar, supra note 204, at 138.
247. Id. at 139-40. This parallels the present popularity of Derek Humphry's
best-seller advocating euthanasia. See HUMPHRY, supra note 13, at 20.
248. Kamisar, supra note 204, at 140.
249. Seawell, supra note 181, at 12.
250. HEIFETZ & MANGEL supra note 1, at 83, 89 (1975).
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IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
Due to the lack of care in drafting Proposition 161 and
the probable interpretation by California's courts, which
would make physician aid-in-dying a reasonable standard for
more than just the terminally ill, alternatives must be ex-
plored. Since it is highly likely that we will face this practice
someday, we must face it intelligently. The following alterna-
tives must be promoted as policy in conjunction with the le-
galization of physician-assisted death. Hospices and aid-in-
dying boards would not necessarily replace physician aid-in-
dying, but could serve to complement the practice.
A. The Case for Eliminating Pain and Other Symptoms:
The Hospice Alternative
Physicians have the potential to make significant ad-
vances in eliminating the pain, fatigue, depression, and hope-
lessness that influence a patient's decision. The majority of
physicians, however, do not receive the training they need to
eliminate all the factors that compel a patient to seek a physi-
cian's aid-in-dying.251 The World Health Organization rec-
ommends that governments procure a pain relief policy
before considering active euthanasia legislation.252 Such a
policy should involve hospice care.
A hospice is a place where caregivers and family mem-
bers join together to help the patient live his or her final days
free from pain and depression.25 3 While a hospital is gener-
ally considered a poor place in which to die, the hospice is an
attractive alternative. Considering that increasing numbers
of people are dying in hospitals as a result of the increase of
death from degenerative diseases,25 4 policies should be imple-
mented to support hospices.
The hospice benefits both the patient and his or her fam-
ily. Freed from pain by virtue of pain-killing drugs, the pa-
tient may become a person again in his or her final few
weeks. It is certainly more dignified for one to die calmly in
the hospice environment rather than being forced to make an
251. Foley, supra note 188, at 289, 295. See also supra text accompanying
notes 218-219 (discussing physician training).
252. Foley, supra note 188 at 289, 293.
253. See generally JACK M. ZIMMERMAN, HOSPICE: COMPLETE CARE FOR THE
TERMINALLY ILL iX-X (1981).
254. Alexander, supra note 25, at 67, 68-69.
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impulsive decision to terminate one's life while pained and
fatigued in a hospital.255 Moreover, hospice patients can still
contribute to society,256 and the possibility of recovery, how-
ever remote, always remains.
The hospice staff not only strives to help the patient, but
it also helps the patient's family.25 v One goal of the hospice is
to make sure the patient dies on the best possible terms with
his or her family.258 For this reason, family members can
visit during any hour of the day and can participate directly
in the nursing. One can easily follow the story of a woman
who attempted to care for her husband at home before the
psychological stress from the situation hardened her and
made her ignore her husband's complaints. Once he entered
a hospice, she was able to cope with his illness and give him
the love he desperately needed.25 9 Making the patient whole
again and bringing families together at the bedside is what
the hospice does best.
Family members also benefit independently of the pa-
tient. They can interact with and learn from other families
who are facing a similar predicament. Moreover, the family
environment of the hospice allows the patient's family mem-
bers to seek counseling from the hospice's staff mem-
bers-even after the death of their loved one.26°
Although there are potential benefits for both the patient
and his or her family, some believe many aspects of the hos-
pice are inappropriate.26 ' One scholar, Colin Brewer, objects
to the primarily religious nature of the hospice movement in
Britain.26 2 He says that many of the British hospices are run
255. There are four fears a patient has: (i) being sustained in a vegetative
state against her wishes, (ii) suffering a lingering death tormented by pain, (iii)
losing control, and (iv) being an intolerable burden on her family. David Rehm
& Edward Martin, The Hospice Response to Proposals of Assisted Suicide, 75
RHODE ISLAND MED. J 127, 128 (March, 1992). These fears can be shared with
the hospice practitioners and resolved so that suicide is no longer desired;
"when the patient is offered physician-supervised palliative care.., the suicide
option is no longer necessary." Id. at 128.
256. For instance, one patient translated an autobiography in a doctor's li-
brary from French to English. HEIFETZ & MANGEL, supra note 1, at 162-63.
257. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 253, at 45.
258. See id.
259. HEIFETZ & MANGEL, supra note 1, at 155.
260. Id. at 164.
261. Colin Brewer, The Hospice Movement, in VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 203,
204 (A.B. Downing ed., 1986).
262. Id. at 206
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by religious "totalitarian[s]" who cannot claim to be running a
"truly human, flexible, and comprehensive service."263 He
tells the story of a hospice patient, Mrs. N, who consistently
requested an immediate death by pleading, "[y]ou wouldn't
treat a puppy like this, would you?" 264 In return, the reli-
gious caregivers consistently responded, "God is with you,
Mrs. N" and refused to fulfill her wish to die.265 Brewer's ul-
timate conclusion is that "hospices are fine for those people
who choose to die the hospice way," but others, like Mrs. N,
deserve the option of a quick and merciful death.2 66 In other
words, Brewer supports a two-headed view whereby hospices
and voluntary active euthanasia co-exist.267
Such a two-headed view is potentially problematic in two
ways. First, the effect of a neighboring patient who gives in
and accepts voluntary active euthanasia has a profound effect
in making the patient think he or she, too, should free his or
her family of a burden; the right to die becomes a duty to
die.268 Brewer counters that just as fertility measures and
abortion procedures take place at the same institution, so too
can physician-assisted death take place in a hospice.269
The two-headed view is potentially problematic in a sec-
ond way. When physician-assisted death becomes legal,
there is less incentive to create hospices, and those who do
not choose the physician-assisted death will either be denied
a hospice because there are none,27 ° or feel guilt if they do
enter a hospice. Such guilt could counter the effectiveness of
the hospice in providing a comfortable, guilt-free, pain-free
death.
To avoid the problems of a two-headed system, the ideal
hospice must promote compassionate pain-healing and tran-
263. Id. at 209. See also HUMPHRY, supra note 13. Humphry writes that the
religious-based hospices are more likely to be found on the East Coast of the
United States, while the more "humanitarian" hospices are found on the West
Coast. Id. at 35.
264. Brewer, supra note 261, at 204.
265. Id. at 207.
266. Id. at 207.
267. Derek Humphry's Hemlock Society also supports such co-existence. See
HUMPHRY, supra note 13.
268. Brewer, supra note 261, at 207.
269. Id. at 205.
270. In Holland, there are few hospices. Foley, supra note 188 at 289, 293.
This can be attributed to the fact that accepting active euthanasia decreases
the incentive to create hospices, or it can be attributed to the fact that the pri-
vate individual in Holland has access to pain-killing drugs.
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quillity. While privately run hospices are admirable, the
state must be sure that people of all economic classes have
access. The state can achieve this goal by setting up its own
state-run facilities, or better yet, by ensuring that insurance
companies will provide coverage for one's stay in any hospice.
If insurance companies are allowed to refuse coverage for
hospice stays, the alternative of physician-assisted death be-
comes inordinately attractive for the financially
disadvantaged.
Thus, hospices are an important part of the recom-
mended pain-relief program. If both hospices and physician-
assisted death are available, a patient will weigh the benefits
of each. To make sure that one's balancing is not improperly
influenced by his or her lack of knowledge or by coercive pres-
sures, an advisory board must be formed.
B. The Case for Proper Decision-Making: Advisory Boards
The drafters of Proposition 161 recognized the impor-
tance of collaborative decision-making in requiring that two
independent physicians certify a patient's request for aid-in-
dying.271 But the "independence" of two physicians working
in the same community is rare. Physicians tend to work in
concert with others and rarely question one another's profes-
sional judgment.272 In order to ensure that decision-making
is truly collaborative, any proposal for physician aid-in-dying
must include a provision for an advisory board.
Medical advisory boards are widely used by hospitals
when allocating organs for transplant and when determining
whether an experimental drug should be used on a particular
patient.2 73 The interdisciplinary boards can be composed of
physicians, ethics specialists, members of the clergy, and law-
yers. Such diverse membership ensures that decisions will be
made after consideration of all relevant ethical, moral, medi-
cal, and legal issues.274
271. See supra text accompanying notes 165-166.
272. See Robertson, supra note 37, at 266 n.275.
273. See generally David C. Blake, The Hospice Ethics Committee: Health
Cares'Moral Conscience or White Elephant?, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6-11 (Mar.-
Apr. 1992) (explaining the traditional functions of an ethics committee are
three: (1) case review or consultation, (2) policy or guidelines development, and
(3) education in the field of bio-ethics).
274. In Holland, the University Hospital of Utrecht recommends that doctors
who are approached with a request for aid-in-dying are to protect themselves
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1. Advantages of an Advisory Board
Collaborative decision-making serves two primary pur-
poses: the board is used to ensure that the patient makes an
informed, rational choice, and the board serves to protect the
physician from liability. The board would make sure that the
patient is fully exposed to information through the gathering
of evidence and subpoenaing of witnesses. Dialogue regard-
ing these issues would ensure that all possible options for a
particular patient have been explored.2 75 While the Board
deliberates, a "cooling-off" period is artificially manufactured
for the patient, who can then reverse or revise what would
otherwise be a hasty and irrevocable decision.276
The existence of the board diffuses the responsibility for
the physician as well. In light of the effect a doctor's close
relationship may have on his or her decision-making, 277 the
board is important to ensure impartiality and to make sure
that objectivity is not compromised. Without a board, a doc-
tor is asked to play judge,278 a role for which he or she has
not been trained. Without training, a doctor cannot identify,
assess, and balance all the interests involved. 279 Any one in-
dividual's decision will reflect his or her socio-economic class
and personal biases. 2 0 In sum, a decision-making body is
from liability by reporting to a team consisting of the attending physician, the
chief of service, and the head nurse. M.A.M de Wachter, supra note 8, at 3319
(1989). If this team reaches a unanimous agreement, then the issue is referred
to the director of the hospital. Id. If there is not a unanimous agreement, a
consultative committee (to be nominated by the director) will make a final deci-
sion. Id. For further information regarding recent legislation likely to take ef-
fect in 1994, see generally, supra note 8.
275. See Karen Teel, The Physician's Dilemma, A Doctor's View: What the
Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8 (1975).
276. Such a waiting period had been advocated in order to diminish the in-
fluence of hyperbolic post-partum emotions in the event of parents considering
involuntary euthanasia of defective newborns. Robertson, supra note 37, at 267
n.275. The Model Act also recommends a cooling-off period. See also Kurtz &
Saks, supra note 5 at 125. Much of the disagreement with Proposition 161 can
be attributed to the Act's failure to provide a waiting period. See CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 3, 1992, at 34 (1992) (rebuttal to
argument in favor of Proposition 161).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 210-242.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 169-171; see also Robertson, supra
note 38, at 264.
279. See Robertson, supra note 37, at 264.
280. Id.
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better equipped than two quasi-independent physicians to
make a dispassionate and socially desirable decision.2 '
2. Disadvantages of an Advisory Board
The disadvantage of the board is that it interferes with
the patient's private decision. It may be inappropriate for in-
vestigators to be traipsing through the patient's hospital
room during such a private time as his or her final days of
life. Deliberation by the board prolongs the patient's death
after he or she has already admitted that his or her life is not
worth living.282 In short, the existence of the board means
this will not be a purely private decision.
The board may also fail for other policy reasons. As each
board at each hospital will make its decisions on a case-by-
case basis, uniformity of decision will not be possible. More-
over, the board adds to the long list of committees that some
believe already clog medical decision-making. 2 3 Lastly, the
board may be vulnerable to pressure to accept the physician's
judgment. A proclivity to act in the hospital's interests
rather than the patient's could lead to bias in the decision-
making and an increase in hospital bureaucracy.28 4
3. The Likelihood of Boards Becoming Common
Practice: Weighing the Advantages and
Disadvantages
Without a statutory provision, it is unlikely that the Cal-
ifornia courts would recommend the formation of an aid-in-
281. Proposals for post-hoc review committees have also been made. See id.
at 267. These mirror "tissue committees" of peer review. See id. In Holland, a
proposal has been made to report each closed case to the coroner, who can then
decide whether or not to send his findings along to the prosecutor. M.A.M. de
Wachter, supra note 8, at 3316, 3319. The guidelines recently approved by Hol-
land's lower house subsume this proposal. Jones, supra note 8, at AS. In light
of the irrevocable finality of physician-assisted death, this comment encourages
prevention of problems rather than post-hoc punishment.
282. The Model Act requires the board to meet within two business days fol-
lowing the request and to make its decision within seven days of the request,
but in no event is the board to take more than 30 days. Kurtz & Saks, supra
note 5, at 125 § 9-102.
283. See Robertson, supra note 38, at 264-65.
284. See Greg Short, Government Intervention in Medical Jurisprudence:
The Development of Regulations to Control the Selective Non-treatment of Se-
verely Handicapped Newborns 74 (1986) (unpublished, M. Poli. Sci. thesis, Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) (citing Carol Levine, Ques-
tions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers about Hospital Ethics Committees, 5
HASTINGS CENTER RPT., June, 1984, at 9, 11)).
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dying board. The Bouvia court explained that a board would
be superfluous.285
Perhaps the case of active euthanasia could be distin-
guished, however, in that more than just an individual's au-
tonomous decision is at stake; issues of competence, coercion,
physicians' roles, and society's traditional disgust for suicide
abound. After all, the Bouvia court stated that cutting short
one's life is "far different"28 6 from allowing the natural dying
process to take place. When we legalize affirmative steps to-
wards killing someone, there is a greater potential for inter-
fering with the state's interest in preserving life.
Once we distinguish active euthanasia, the advantages of
an advisory board can be seen to outweigh its disadvantages.
Short time delays and slight interferences with the patient's
privacy in his or her hospital room are a small price to pay for
ensuring the protection of an individual's choice. The forma-
tion of an advisory board can help to ensure that the decision
being made is truly rational and that the socially desirable
outcome takes place. The drafters of Proposition 161 recog-
nized a need for some level of collaborative decision-making
here, and the existence of an advisory board ensures that the
responsibility for the decision will be diffused.
V. CHECKLIST OF PROPOSALS
In the future, any policy maker, drafter, or voter consid-
ering a statute to legalize physician-assisted death should
consider the following:
1.) The Statute's Objective: The state and its people have a
strong interest in preserving life and in preventing desensiti-
zation to the taking of a life. Concomitant with any legaliza-
tion of physician-assisted death, the state must promote at-
tractive alternatives to the procedure. Moreover, appropriate
safeguards must insulate one's choice from influential
factors.
2.) The Statute's Directive: (i) The statute should provide for
advanced directives, preferably made before the onset of ill-
ness, but subject to change at any time, and change should be
encouraged; (ii) The specific request for physician-assisted
285. See supra text accompanying notes 126-127. But cf In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 672 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976) (recommending the formation of a medical
board). See also supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 234.
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death must be made on two occasions; (iii) At least a 24-hour
waiting period must separate the two requests.
3.) The Family: (i) A physician must ask the patient if he
can notify a family member or friend; (ii) In the event the
patient chooses a third party to be notified, the physician
must take all reasonable measures to notify that person; (iii)
In the event the patient does not want anybody notified, the
physician must heed the patient's desire; (iv) In the event a
patient chooses to have someone notified and that person
strongly opposes the procedure, the physician must focus on
his relationship with and knowledge of the patient in deter-
mining whether or not the procedure should be carried out.
4.) Terminal Illness Mandated: (i) The patient must be ter-
minally ill; (ii) Under no circumstances will this procedure be
extended to a person who is not terminally ill.
5.) Advisory Board: (i) Interdisciplinary advisory boards
composed of physicians, ethicists, lawyers, or psychologists
must be formed; (ii) Whenever the procedure is requested,
the advisory board must be notified in order to make the de-
termination that the statute's requirements are followed; (iii)
Immediately after the patient makes his or her initial re-
quest, the board should begin its fact-finding process. The
board must act under the rebuttable presumption that the
patient has made a voluntary choice; (iv) The advisory board
must act by majority vote within three days of the initial
request.
6.) Physicians: (i) At least two physicians, in addition to
those serving on the advisory board, must authorize the re-
quest; (ii) One of the authorizing physicians should be the
patient's primary attending physician; (iii) The other physi-
cian must have at least ten years' experience in diagnosing
terminal diseases and working with the terminally ill. This
physician will be specially licensed after receiving training in
how to advise the patient, how to best estimate when a pa-
tient is truly terminal, and how to determine whether the pa-
tient and physician have followed the legal requirements.
This physician must be associated with a hospice program.
7.) Hospices: (i) Physician-assisted death is unavailable if
the physician does not apprise the patient of the hospice al-
ternative; (ii) Public and private insurance must fund hos-
pice care as they would fund hospital care.
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8.) Insurance: (i) Insurance companies must not actively
promote physician-assisted death; (ii) Insurance companies
do not have causes of action against physicians for pursuance
or non-pursuance of physician-assisted death; (iii) Rate
schedules for the care of the terminally ill must not diverge
from the rate schedules composed for other forms of care.
Anyone facing a proposal attempting to legalize physi-
cian-assisted death should consider the areas listed above.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has explored the motivation for and possi-
bility of physician-assisted death becoming law. In Novem-
ber of 1992, voters in California narrowly rejected Proposi-
tion 161, which would have legalized the practice. Before
such a measure is proposed again, the language will have to
be clearer to ensure against loopholes and provide safeguards
against abuse. The near-victory for Proposition 161 indicates
that the proper safeguards would have garnered a majority
vote and that the time for legalized physician-assisted death
is nearing. The courts will likely accept what the voters
accept.
Neither the voters nor the courts, however, should ignore
alternatives to physician-assisted death. Encouraging the
use of hospices and the formation of advisory boards will en-
sure that the legal killing, as authorized by voters, is not
abused. To ignore the alternatives is to make physician-as-
sisted death the only option. When the state fails to en-
courage alternatives, it is implicitly supporting physician-as-
sisted death while failing to maintain its interest in the
preservation of life. A government that does not act to pre-
serve the lives of its citizens is not a noble government.
Daryl J. Miller
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